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For generations, Muslims around the world consider insurance to be suspect.1 Many 
Islamic scholars reject conventional insurance, especially life insurance, since it 
involves elements prohibited by the Shariah (Islamic law).2 There are several fatawah 
(juristic opinions concerning Islamic law) opposing insurance,3 such as the fatwah of 
the First International Conference on Islamic Economics held at Makkah in 1976, 
concluding that “commercial insurance as presently practiced does not satisfy the 
Islamic conditions for it to become acceptable”.4 
It is important to understand that not the idea of insurance itself is unlawful but rather 
the current practice of conventional insurance.5 In 1985, the Fiqu Academy resolved 
that commercial insurance contracts are prohibited under the Shariah and should 
therefore be avoided by Muslims.6 However, at the same time, the Fiqu Academy 
approved takaful as Shariah compliant alternative to conventional insurance, based 
on the principles of ta’awun (mutual assistance), brotherhood and ethical operations.7 
The Fiqu Academy can be regarded as the highest authority in jurisprudence affairs 
although its resolutions are not binding. As part of the OIC (Organisation of Islamic 
Conference), resolutions of the Fiqh Academy have nevertheless a strong impact.8 
The word takaful derives from the Arabic verb kafala meaning ‘to guarantee’,9 and 
stands for guaranteeing each other.10 The origins of takaful can be traced to the 
customary practice of aqilah among Arab tribes in the pre-Islamic era.11 Aqilah refers 
to an agreement of tribal solidarity. If a member of a tribe was killed by a member of 
a different tribe, the relatives of the deceased would receive diyah (blood money) 
from the family of the accused. Under this system, all members of the accused tribe 
pooled their resources to spread the financial burden.12 Prophet Muhammad also 
approved this practice of mutual compensation and joint responsibility during his 
                                                 
1
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 375 
2
 cf. Billah (1998), 391 
3
 cf. Ayub (2007), 430-431 
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 Rashid (1993), 21 
5
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 cf. S. Abdi, Taking takaful to the next level, in: Jaffer (2007), 30 
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 cf. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (2010), 13 
8
 cf. Munich Re Group (2008), 10 
9
 cf. A.P. Smith, Takaful business models, in: Jaffer (2007), 88 
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 cf. Stagg-Macey (2007), 1 
11
 cf. Rashid (1993), 17 
12
 cf. Morgan Stanley (2008), 6 
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lifetime.13 Throughout the period of Islamic civilization, the concept of takaful 
expanded further in particular among Muslim merchants who contributed to a fund to 
cover anyone in the group suffering mishaps or robberies during sea voyages.14 
Later on, the Ottoman Empire introduced the Western concept of marine insurance in 
its Maritime Code of 1863 and approved other aspects of non-life insurance by the 
Ottoman Law of Insurance in 1874. Only life insurance was regarded as haram 
(unlawful).15 
The first modern takaful undertaking was founded in Sudan in 1979.16 Since its 
emergence, the Islamic insurance industry has been showing significant growth 
rates,17 and the awareness and acceptance of takaful products has been increasing 
in Muslim countries.18 The takaful market is currently concentrated in Southeast Asia 
and the Middle East. However, insurance companies and customers are realizing 
more and more that takaful is attractive to non-Muslims as well due to its combination 
of an ethical investment policy with a significant growth potential and price 
competitiveness.19 
In the following, it is first of all examined why conventional insurance is prohibited 
under the Shariah. After the critical elements are revealed, the basic concept of 
takaful and its features are presented. For a better understanding, a direct 
comparison between Islamic and conventional insurance is given. Focus of this 
thesis is an examination of the different business models of takaful applied in 
practice. In this respect, the four most common takaful models, namely the 
mudarabah, the wakalah, the combined and the waqf model, are explained and 
discussed in detail. As it represents an essential part of the whole takaful industry, 
retakaful (Islamic reinsurance) is also commented on. Finally, the Islamic insurance 
market is analyzed, taking into account its current situation, its opportunities as well 
as its challenges. 
                                                 
13
 cf. Farooq et al. (2010), 56 
14
 cf. M.M. Hussain, Legal lssues in Takaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 67 
15 cf. Mahmood (1991), 281 
16
 cf. Taylor (2005), 1 
17
 cf. Fitch Ratings (2007), 19 
18
 cf. E. Hassan and A. Rohayem, Transparency and Financial Reporting in Islamic Insurance, in: Archer et al. (2009), 265 
19
 cf. Ahmad et al. (2010), 6 
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2. Why is conventional insurance haram? 
The Arabic word Shariah denotes literally ‘the way to the source of life’.20 The 
Shariah represents the body of Islamic religious law and provides a comprehensive 
code of conduct for human behaviour in day-to-day life including banking, business, 
economics, crime, politics, family, inheritance, prayer, food, hygiene and social 
issues. It is derived from two primary sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah (word and 
actions of or approved by the Holy Prophet).21 Over the time, the two secondary 
sources qiyas and ijma came into being in order to deal with new developments 
which were nonexistent at the time of the Prophet. Qiyas refers to analogical 
reasoning applied by Islamic scholars. Ijma stands for the consensus of the Islamic 
community on a legal issue.22 It has to be taken into consideration, that there are 
different schools in Islamic law whereas the two main ones are the Sunni and the 
Shi’a. Hence, legal interpretations can vary among distinct schools and territories.23 
Different business models in takaful and their permissibility in different regions can be 
regarded as a consequence thereof. 
It has to be emphasized again that efforts to avoid risk are not against Islamic 
teachings. The reason why conventional insurance is considered as haram (unlawful) 
under the Shariah is because it involves at least three forbidden elements, namely 
gharar (uncertainty), maisir (speculation) and riba (interest). These elements are 
examined in the following. 
2.1. Gharar (uncertainty) 
Any contract of exchange involving gharar is forbidden under the Shariah. Gharar 
appears in a contract when liabilities are uncertain, undetermined or contingent.24 
Mutual consent and veracity constitute basic requirements for a valid contract in 
Islam. Insufficient information can convey a wrong impression of significant aspects 
of a contract and, hence, renders mutual consent impossible.25 In an insurance 
contract, there is uncertainty in respect to whether the insured suffers actually a loss, 
                                                 
20
 cf. Algaoud and Lewis (2007), 38 
21
 cf. Pervez (1990), 159-160 
22
 cf. Mohammed (1988), 115 
23
 cf. Mankabady (1989), 199 
24
 cf. Ayub (2007), 419 
25
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 374 
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the amount of indemnity to be paid and the time of occurrence of a loss.26 
Furthermore, risk can be defined as uncertainty of loss and represents consequently 
already by nature a kind of gharar. Putting risk as the subject matter of a contract of 
exchange, as it is the case in conventional insurance, is therefore unlawful.27 
Nevertheless, most Shariah scholars start recognizing that actuarial work entails 
social benefits, and relate gharar now to legal or contractual uncertainty, not to 
uncertain outcomes.28 Dharura (necessity) and maslaha (public interest) are also 
accepted grounds of justification in Islamic jurisprudence that render prohibited things 
permissible. In modern life, insurance conforms to the requirements of dharura as 
long as there is no viable alternative. In this case, however, the level of uncertainty 
and ignorance in an insurance contract has to be reduced as effectively as 
possible.29 
2.2. Maisir (speculation) 
The Arabic word maisir stands for getting something too easily or taking profits 
without working for it. Maisir is therefore linked to gambling and speculation.30 
Conventional insurance involves maisir because policyholders are considered to be 
betting premiums on the condition that the insurer has to pay an amount of indemnity 
in case of a specified event. The insurance company, in turn, can be regarded as 
basing its fortune on good or bad luck of the policyholders.31 
Generally, maisir is present in transactions entailing unnecessary risk in the spirit of 
speculation, which is the case in insurance whenever indemnities exceed premiums 
and vice versa.32 However, some jurists dissent the accusation that insurance 
involves maisir. According to them, the financial motivation for insurance is rather the 
desire for protection against loss than achieving gain from speculation.33 
                                                 
26
 cf. Billah and Patel (2003), 5 
27
 cf. M. Akoob, Reinsurance and Retakaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 152 
28
 cf. R. Wilson, Concerns and misconceptions in the provision of takaful, in: Jaffer (2007), 73 
29
 cf. Rashid (1993), 23 
30
 cf. Mohammed (1988), 121 
31
 cf. Munich Re Group (2008), 10 
32
 cf. Mahmood (1991), 284 
33
 cf. Al-Ghadyan (1999), 334 
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2.3. Riba (interest) 
Riba is explicitly forbidden in four different verses in the Qur’an. It is also stated in it 
that those who neglect the prohibition of interest are at war with God and his Prophet 
Muhammad.34 Even though there is no specific justification for the prohibition of riba 
in the Qur’an, there is consent among Muslim scholars that riba is unlawful because 
it poses a source of social, economic and moral evil and therewith contradicts the 
Islamic principle of brotherhood.35 
In conventional insurance, riba occurs twofold – directly and indirectly. On the one 
hand, it is directly involved since the amounts of premiums and claims paid differ 
usually. On the other hand, there is an indirect involvement by reason of interest-
based investment activities of the insurance companies.36 
Furthermore, there is a strict code of ethical investment required in Islamic finance. 
As a result, investing in haram activities or items, such as alcohol or pork meat, is 
unlawful under the Shariah.37 Especially life insurance policies include a significant 
investment or savings element, and the insurance companies carry on their business 
by investing collected premiums in a mix of investments including interest-based 
finance and prohibited industries.38 
                                                 
34
 cf. Algaoud and Lewis (2007), 39-41 
35
 cf. Mahmood (1991), 282 
36
 cf. Ayub (2007), 419 
37
 cf. Algaoud and Lewis (2007), 39 
38
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 375 
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3. Fundamentals of takaful 
In order to align insurance with Islamic principles and to avoid the elements of 
gharar, maisir as well as riba, Shariah scholars recommend the concept of takaful. 
As defined in the Malaysian Takaful Act of 1984, takaful refers to “a scheme based 
on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance which provides for mutual financial 
aid and assistance to the participants in case of need whereby the participants 
mutually agree to contribute for that purpose”.39 Takaful business is further 
characterized as a business “whose aims and operations do not involve any element 
which is not approved by the Shariah”.40 
In this sense, takaful should be based on the concept of risk pooling under inclusion 
of a professional services manager who charges for his services but does not take 
profit from insurance activities.41 From the policyholders’ point of view, mutual help is 
the major goal of takaful. Considering though that it represents a business venture, 
the operator is entitled to take fees and/or to share in profits in return for its 
services.42 The role of the insurance company therefore basically changes from a risk 
bearer to a risk manager.43 Consequently, the profit for the takaful company should 
emerge from risk management and not from frisk taking.44 
There are two principal steps to be taken to circumvent the Shariah problematic of 
conventional insurance. Firstly, instead of transferring risk to the insurer, a mutual 
structure is adopted for underwriting the insured risks. Put more simply, the 
participants (policyholders) mutually insure one another according to the principle of 
solidarity. Secondly, the contributions paid (premiums) are characterized as 
conditional and irrevocable donation (principle of tabarru’). That means the 
participant makes a donation to the risk fund on condition of being entitled to benefit 
from mutual protection against insured losses.45 In the following paragraphs, the 
fundamentals of takaful are explained in more detail. 
                                                 
39
 Takaful Act 1984, Art.2 
40
 Takaful Act 1984, Art.2 
41
 cf. Munich Re Group (2008), 12 
42
 cf. Ayub (2007), 422 
43
 cf. M. Akoob, Reinsurance and Retakaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 153 
44
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 376 
45
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 1-2 
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3.1. Hybrid structure 
As Islamic insurance operates on the basis of shared responsibility, joint indemnity, 
common interest and solidarity, the fundamental philosophy of takaful can be 
compared to cooperative or mutual insurance whereby participants pool their funds 
together to insure one another.46 Due to this similarity, it would seem natural to form 
a takaful undertaking as cooperative entity.47 However, there are two obstacles for an 
establishment as pure mutual. First of all, the legal framework in many countries 
does not allow for cooperatives without share capital. And second, even where the 
legal infrastructure is available, it proves exceedingly difficult to raise enough capital 
to meet regulatory capital adequacy and solvency requirements.48 
To surmount these obstacles, a typical takaful undertaking operates on the basis of a 
two-tier structure that is a hybrid of a mutual and a commercial form of company.49  
The risk funds of the policyholders operate on a mutual basis, but are managed by a 
takaful operator which is a company with shareholders. Key role of the stock 
company with shareholders’ funds is the provision of capital backing for underwriting 
to meet solvency requirements.50 A takaful undertaking which is based on a 
commercial contract between the takaful operator and the participants, where the 
operator is expected to make profit, is also sometimes referred to as tejari model in 
literature.51 
Due to the hybrid structure, there are two main stakeholders in a takaful undertaking, 
namely shareholders and policyholders. 
3.2. Main stakeholders 
Takaful participants (TPs) are policyholders of Islamic insurance who participate in a 
Shariah compliant undertaking of mutual risk cover. They pay contractually fixed 
contributions to the participants’ takaful fund (PTF). This fund constitutes a separate 
risk fund or underwriting pool from which compensations and operating expenses are 
                                                 
46
 cf. Billah and Patel (2003), 5 
47
 cf. M.M. Hussain, Legal Issues in Takaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 69 
48
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 58 
49
 cf. A. Haron and D. Taylor, Risk Management in Takaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 170 
50
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 288 
51
 cf. Mortuza Ali (2006), 3 
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financed.52 The TPs are together the owners to the fund. The amount paid by the 
participant is not a premium in the conventional sense. The participant brings its risk 
into the pool and pays a specific amount which is equivalent to the risk brought in.53 
Not everybody who contributes to the PTF gets any compensation in return. 
Payments of indemnity depend ultimately on the occurrence of certain insured events 
against which the risk fund is established.54 The monetary value of claims in the 
event of loss is also specified in the contract. Participants receive underwriting 
surpluses and investment profits and should therefore also bear deficits and losses.55 
The takaful operator (TO) represents the legal entity that initiates and manages the 
takaful fund.56 It appears as a commercial management company with its own share 
capital and reserves.57 The TO manages merely underwriting and investments by 
order of the TPs.58 For these services rendered for and on behalf of the 
policyholders, the operator is entitled to a remuneration.59 Depending on the 
business model applied, the TO serves either as agent (wakeel) for the TPs, as 
entrepreneur (mudarib) or as both agent and entrepreneur. In all the cases, the 
operator does not have any ownership rights of the takaful fund. 60 
3.3. Concept of tabarru’ 
Due to the prohibition of gharar, a commercial contract has to be free from 
uncertainties regarding rights and liabilities of the parties.61 Conventional insurance 
involves unavoidable uncertainty as it is premised on the exchange of premiums for 
future indemnities in the case of specified events.62 Since uncertainties cannot be 
removed completely from insurance, takaful takes advantage of a type of contract 
which can tolerate the presence of gharar and is valid and enforceable in Islamic law. 
This contract is based on the concept of tabarru’ and can be categorised as a 
unilateral declaration of intent that leads to a transfer of ownership to another party 
                                                 
52
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 11 
53
 cf. M. Akoob, Reinsurance and Retakaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 153 
54
 cf. M.D. Bakar, Shari’ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Archer et al. (2009), 32 
55
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 11 
56
 cf. A. Murray, Issues in Rating Takaful Companies, in: Archer et al. (2009), 239 
57
 cf. M. Akoob, Reinsurance and Retakaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 154 
58
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 11 
59
 cf. E. Hassan and A. Rohayem, Transparency and Financial Reporting in Islamic Insurance, in: Archer et al. (2009), 270 
60
 cf. Patel (2009), 5 
61
 cf. Ayub (2007), 421 
62
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 9 
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without the need for the recipient to pay any consideration.63 The Arabic word 
tabarru’ stands in general for donation, contribution or gift. Related to takaful, it 
means a voluntary individual contribution to a risk pool.64 
In commercial contracts, such as sale or lease, one party may be put at 
disadvantage due to elements of gharar. But for one-sided transfers, the requirement 
of certainty is irrelevant as its realization is based on the goodwill of the donor. 
Purpose of the donation contract is to benefit the recipient without any predetermined 
consideration in return. In takaful, it implies that a participant donates some money to 
give favour to the other participants according to agreed terms and conditions.65 
Overall what makes gharar acceptable in Islamic insurance is that tabarru’ 
contributions aim at risk pooling not at taking profit from uncertainty.66 
However, it has do be mentioned that the motivation of a participant for donating his 
money into a risk pool is neither altruism nor the well-being of others. The TP rather 
expects to be indemnified himself in the case of damage or loss. That is to say, 
participants donate their contributions to the takaful fund on condition to be also 
compensated from the risk pool if they suffer a loss as specified in the contract.67 
This raises the question whether a donation can be made conditional upon 
consideration. A conditional gift for consideration exists in Islamic commercial law 
and is, according to Islamic jurisprudence, also in line with the Shariah. Donating 
something with the prospect of benefitting perhaps afterwards of it cannot be 
regarded as unlawful. It is not sure whether the donor makes ever a claim and even 
though he makes a claim, the indemnity is paid out of a common pool where moneys 
are mixed and in the end inseparable.68 
3.4. General versus family takaful 
As also classified by the Takaful Act of Malaysia of 1984, there are two main lines of 
Islamic insurance, namely general (non-life) and family (life) takaful.69 General takaful 
covers losses accruing out of personal accidents and property damage. Family 
                                                 
63
 cf. M.D. Bakar, Shari’ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Archer et al. (2009), 35 
64
 cf. M.T. Ahmad Nordin, Strengths and opportunities of takaful: the spiritual dimension, in: Jaffer (2007), 156 
65
 cf. M.D. Bakar, Shari’ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Archer et al. (2009), 35-36 
66
 cf. R. Wilson, Concerns and misconceptions in the provision of takaful, in: Jaffer (2007), 76 
67
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 9 
68
 cf. M.D. Bakar, Shari’ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Archer et al. (2009), 36-37 
69
 cf. Takaful Act 1984, Art.3(1) 
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takaful represents the Shariah compliant alternative to life insurance. Its aims are 
threefold. First of all, it should encourage participants to save regularly. Secondly, it 
allows for investment in line with Islamic principles. And in the third place, it provides 
protection to the heirs of TPs who die prematurely.70 Besides long-term life insurance 
plans, family takaful offers as well medical and health, accident and education 
plans.71 
In the case of non-life takaful, the entire contribution of a TP is treated as a donation 
for protection purposes and paid into the PTF. Due to the tabarru’ contract, the 
participant looses his individual ownership rights in favour of the takaful fund. All 
participants own the risk fund collectively and the underwriting surplus belongs to 
them. In case of a deficit, the takaful company provides a qard hasan (interest-free 
loan) to the fund. Each TP has the right to claim from the takaful fund in certain cases 
which are specified in the contract.72  
In life business, the contribution incorporates a savings or investment element in 
addition to the risk protection element. The savings component is not a donation into 
the collective risk pool, but a payment into a separate investment fund referred to as 
participants’ investment fund (PIF).73 In contrast to the risk fund, the ownership rights 
of the investment funds remain with each participant individually. In general, 
contributions in family takaful can be looked upon more as an investment than a 
donation since the investment part for generating returns is usually much larger than 
the protection part.74 Consequently, the takaful operator is especially in charge of the 
profitable investment of contributions on behalf of the TPs.75 
3.5. Qard hasan 
In takaful, there is the contingency that the actual amount of claims exceeds the 
amount available in the risk fund, that is to say, the risk pool runs into deficit. 
Therefore the question arises, who is liable for the deficit. Since the TPs hold 
                                                 
70
 cf. Mahmood (1991), 288 
71
 cf. Morgan Stanley (2008), 7 
72
 cf. Ayub (2007), 422-423 
73
 cf. A. Haron and D. Taylor, Risk Management in Takaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 170 
74
 cf. M.D. Bakar, Shari’ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Archer et al. (2009), 38-39 
75
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 11-12 
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collectively the ownership rights of the risk fund and the TO is merely its custodian, it 
suggests itself that the participants also have to cover the deficit.76 
Nevertheless, coverage through the participants is only possible by the means of 
future contributions, and future contributions do not solve the problem of immediate 
insolvency. For that reason, the TO is expected to provide an interest-free loan 
referred to as qard hasan, which can be recovered from future contributions by the 
participants.77 Since the loan increases liabilities of the risk fund contemporaneously 
with the assets, it does not clear the deficit but it provides liquidity so as to obligations 
of the fund can be fulfilled. 
In most countries, the financial regulatory authority forces takaful operators to provide 
a qard hasan when underwriting leads to a deficit in the risk pool.78 However, not all 
present Takaful Acts stipulate explicitly the obligation of a TO to grant a qard hasan 
facility. Even so, such a facility is very visible and useful for rating agencies. It 
indicates that interests of participants are protected in case of a deficit in the takaful 
fund due to the availability of sufficient shareholders’ funds.79 
3.6. Shariah Board 
The operations of a takaful undertaking are monitored by an independent body 
referred to as Shariah Supervisory Board or Council. The establishment of a Shariah 
Supervisory Board is a precondition for the commencement of a takaful corporation.80 
The Shariah Board is composed of internal or external religious advisors, and it 
ensures the adherence to Shariah rules and principles throughout the operations of a 
takaful undertaking.81 
Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, there is a lack in explicit legal support for the 
establishment of Shariah Councils and decent rules to ensure their integrity are 
absent. As a result, the effectiveness and enforceability of contracts employed by the 
TO as well as the legality of its practices can be challenged. Furthermore, only in few 
jurisdictions, there is a central Shariah Board in existence. However, a general 
                                                 
76
 cf. Archer et al. (2009), 10 
77
 cf. Fitch Ratings (2007), 16 
78
 cf. M.M. Hussain, Legal Issues in Takaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 78-79 
79
 cf. M.D. Bakar, Shari’ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Archer et al. (2009), 40 
80
 cf. Swartz and Coetzer (2010), 336 
81
 cf. Fitch Ratings (2007), 17 
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authority functioning as the highest Shariah Board could ensure a consistent opinion 
on Islamic insurance issues and with it avoid confusion among consumers. A central 
Shariah Council could as well provide substantial legal corroboration in order to 
enforce Shariah compliance in courts.82 
                                                 
82
 cf. M.M. Hussain, Legal Issues in Takaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 80-81 
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4. Comparison to conventional insurance 
In conventional insurance, the insurer provides indemnity in return for a certain 
amount of money which is called premium and paid by the insured.83 By the use of 
insurance, the insured transfers his risk to the insurance company. In doing so, the 
insured replaces uncertainty with certainty at the expense of the premium paid.84 The 
premium is determined by the frequency and severity of the risk as well as by the 
sum insured. The insurance company receives commercial gain from both 
underwriting surplus and return on investment. In summary, conventional proprietary 
insurance can be regarded as business of selling protection for money to the amount 
of the premium.85 
One of the key differences between takaful and conventional insurance is that Islamic 
insurance is based on risk sharing instead of risk transfer. Takaful participants 
mutually insure each other by the means of a collective risk pool. Whereas in 
conventional insurance the insurance company is exclusively held responsible for 
paying all the claims, this obligation lies within the risk fund in the case of takaful.86 
Merely in cases where claims exceed contributions as well as reserves accumulated 
in the risk fund, the TO may be under obligation to provide a qard hasan which has to 
be paid back by the participants out of future contributions (as explained under 
section 3.5.).87 
The risk pool is owned jointly by all participants who share profits and bear deficits of 
the takaful undertaking. As the TO does not take over risk like a conventional 
insurance company, it should not be viewed as an insurer but rather as an operator 
who manages the takaful operations, including in particular underwriting, risk 
calculation, investments and claim processing.88 In consequence, the TO generates 
income from fees and/or profit-sharing determined by the business model applied. 
For a conventional insurer in contrast, the underwriting surplus makes for the 
principal source of profit.89 
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Another decisive difference to conventional insurance is that all takaful products and 
operations must be thoroughly Shariah compliant. Conventional insurers make an 
extensive use of interest-based investments and do not take note of haram 
activities.90 Islamic insurers, in contrast, oblige to undertake solely interest-free, 
Shariah justified investments. Investment profit cannot be based on any unethical 
commercial activity.  Investments in gambling institutions, alcohol businesses or arms 
production are, for instance, explicitly prohibited.91 
In order to render Islamic insurance permissible, the concept of tabarru’ is employed. 
While in conventional insurance a simple exchange contract of sale and purchase is 
applied between the insured and the insurer, takaful makes use of a donation 
contract to allow for Shariah conformity (see section 3.3.).92 As a result, TPs pay 
contributions in form of a conditional donation instead of premiums. In this manner, 
Islamic insurance eliminates the issues of gharar and maisir which are present in 
conventional insurance.93 
Transparency is also a crucial principle of the whole takaful system. It is essential in 
all Islamic insurance models that participants’ and shareholders’ funds are 
separated.94 Different risk and investment pools are as well segregated from each 
other. Hence, underwriting surpluses and deficits cannot be transferred between 
different pools. In conventional insurance, the underwriting surplus belongs to the 
company with the result that there is generally no severe differentiation between 
pools.95 
Stimulated by the desire to maximize profit for shareholders, the risk premium is 
commercially driven in conventional insurance. In takaful however, an underwriting 
deficit is first of all absorbed by reserves, then by a qard hasan facility, and lastly by a 
general increase in contributions. Irrespective of the amount of premium, the 
underwriting surplus is shared between the TPs commensurate with their 
contributions. That way, overpriced premiums of conventional insurers can be 
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studiously avoided. The concept of takaful promotes therefore adequacy and 
incorporates the rules of equity, justice and ethics into the profit element.96 
To be pointed out explicitly, conventional insurance and takaful employ a different 
terminology as already used largely in the preceding parts. Whereas an insured in 
conventional insurance is called policyholder, he is referred to as participant or 
takaful participant (TP) in Islamic insurance. The insurance company per se 
represents an operator not an insurer and is therefore labelled as takaful operator 
(TO). In takaful, participants do not pay premiums but rather contributions or 
donations with the concept of tabarru’ in mind. Table 1 summarizes once again the 
main differences between conventional and Islamic insurance. 
 
 
Table 1:  Main differences between conventional insurance and takaful 
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5. Business models 
There are different takaful models in practice around the world and Shariah scholars 
have raised various concerns pertaining to each model.97 Every model implies 
distinct rights and obligations between the TO and the TPs. However, all business 
models pursue the same goal of sharing individual risks collectively for the purpose 
of reducing the risk exposure of each individual participant against a specified loss. 
There is no evident legal advantage of one business model to another. 
Consequently, takaful operators base their decision of which business model to 
adopt rather on its economic viability than on its legal factors.98 In some jurisdiction, 
there are also regulatory restrictions concerning the applicability of business models. 
At a global level, there are two standard models applied, namely the mudarabah 
model and the wakalah model. Another model prevalent in practice is the 
combination of these two models. The fourth and most recent model gaining 
popularity constitutes the waqf model.99 In principle, these business models differ 
solely in the kind of remuneration of the TO.  All models are built upon the main idea 
of tabarru’ and all of them are in complete accordance regarding the relationship 
among TPs. What makes the difference is the definition of the relationship between 
the operator and the participants.100 
Under the mudarabah model, the TO represents an entrepreneur and the TPs 
provide the capital required. This model implies that profits are shared between the 
operator and the participants. Pursuant to the wakalah model, the TO acts as agent 
on behalf of the participants. Under this contract, the operator receives a fee in return 
for its services. In the combined model, a wakalah arrangement is used concerning 
underwriting business whereas in terms of investment activities a mudarabah 
contract is applied. Consequently the TO is remunerated by a fee for underwriting but 
shares in also the upside of investment profits.101 In terms of the waqf model, the 
relationship between the operator and the TPs is established via a trust, or more 
specifically via the waqf fund. The trust is initially created by a part of the 
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shareholders’ fund.102 The combined model is then applied for underwriting and 
investment.103 Table 2 gives an overview on these four different business models and 
their respective characteristics. In the following, each model is explained and 
discussed in detail. 
It has to be mentioned that there is no consistent terminology in literature in respect 
to business models. For instance, some authors designate the combined model as 
wakalah model. The prefixed terms ‘pure’ and ‘modified’, signifying variations of the 
same model, can be switched also depending on the interpretation of the author. In 
the following, the prevailing terminology is used.104 
5.1. Mudarabah model 
The mudarabah model, which is also known as profit-sharing model, is based on a 
principal-manager agreement.105 It was introduced in the Malaysian market in 
1984,106 and is now mainly applied in the Asia-Pacific region.107 
5.1.1. Basics of the mudarabah model 
In this model, the takaful participants appear as capital providers (rabb al maal). The 
TO acts as entrepreneur (mudarib) who provides the skills required for managing the 
capital, or more specifically the risk funds and in the case of family takaful as well the 
investment funds. The operator is solely the manager of the funds which are owned 
by the TPs. The profit generated by the takaful operation is shared between the 
participants and the operator in a pre-agreed ratio, like 60:40 or 50:50 for example. 
The ratio has to be approved by the Shariah Board of the takaful undertaking each 
year in advance.108 Although profits are shared according to the mudarabah contract, 
losses are solely borne by the participants as rabb al maal. However, in this case, the 
efforts of the operator as mudarib remain also uncompensated. Furthermore the TO 
is expected to provide a qard hasan to a risk fund in deficit.109 
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Table 2:  Overview business models 
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In a pure mudarabah model, profits can be considered as investment profit plus 
underwriting surplus, just as in conventional insurance.110 However, there are severe 
objections by Shariah scholars in taking underwriting excess for profit. Consequently, 
there are also mudarabah models in practice referring profit exclusively to investment 
income.111 Those models are well practicable in family takaful where the investment 
part dominates heavily. But in general takaful, a mudarabah model without profit-
sharing in underwriting surplus is virtually not workable since the proportion available 
for generating investment profits is relatively small.112 
5.1.2. Procedure of the mudarabah model 
With reference to a pure mudarabah model in general takaful, the contributions of 
participants as well as the investment income are first of all used to compensate for 
claims, retakaful expenditures, reserves and other claims-related costs. The 
remaining amount constitutes the surplus which is shared between the TPs and the 
operator or respectively the shareholders. In the case there is a deficit, the TO has to 
provide a qard hasan to the participants. Expenses from running the business, that is 
to say all management and marketing-related expenses should be covered by the 
shareholders in return for their share in the underwriting excess and investment 
profit.113 Hence, shareholders can only realize profit when their share in the total 
surplus exceeds the expenses of managing the takaful undertaking. However, there 
are also mudarabah arrangements that enable operators to charge their operational 
costs to the takaful fund before the total surplus is calculated.114 This practice is not 
in line, though, with the concept of mudarabah.115 Figure 1 illustrates the pure 
mudarabah model in general takaful. Figure 2 shows the structure and procedure in 
family takaful. 
5.1.3. Discussion of the mudarabah model 
From the operator’s perspective, the breakeven point is achieved relatively late under 
the mudarabah model since it takes time to gather sufficient assets for a decent  
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Figure 2: Mudarabah model in family takaful 
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investment income.116 The profit for shareholders is also comparatively volatile. 
However, the returns realized are also frequently higher than in other business 
models.117 Concerning the TPs, this model can be regarded as a very sound model. 
Under a usual mudarabah arrangement, the participants do not account for the 
operator’s expenses directly. All their contributions are in the first place provided to 
satisfy claims. Merely, if there is an underwriting surplus, the TO is compensated. 
And only when its share in the surplus or rather the surplus itself is sufficient, the 
operator takes profits.118 There are though several concerns about Shariah 
compliancy, especially in respect to the underwriting surplus, of the mudarabah 
model for takaful. 
An objection towards this business model is that contributions in the form of tabarru’ 
cannot constitute at the same time mudarabah capital. The concept of tabarru’ 
represents one of the main principles of Islamic insurance. Applying a profit-sharing 
contract to a risk fund made up of donations can be considered indeed doubtful as it 
contradicts its initial cooperative nature. Whereas the idea of mudarabah is eminently 
suited for Islamic banking, it might not be convenient for takaful.119 
Another point of issue poses the sharing of underwriting surplus as already 
mentioned. By sharing in an underwriting surplus, the TO in principle closely 
resembles a conventional insurance company. In conventional insurance, risk is 
transferred to the insurer who in turn receives the underwriting surplus, or if 
necessary bears the deficit. In takaful, risk should be pooled and shared among 
participants so as to any underwriting surplus is due to them. However, in the 
common mudarabah model, shareholders are entitled to a share of the underwriting 
surplus. What it even makes worse is the fact that shareholders only share in an 
underwriting surplus but do not bear any underwriting deficit.120 
Apart from the perspective of most Shariah scholars why sharing in an underwriting 
surplus is seriously challenged, there is also an economic argument against it: By 
participating in an underwriting surplus, the profit of a TO increases in relation to the 
surplus realized. Consequently, the operator is encouraged to maximize the surplus 
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and, by implication, also the level of contributions. From the participants’ point of 
view, however, an underwriting surplus converging towards zero can be considered 
as optimal, given that an adequate amount of reserves has been accumulated. 
Surplus is built up if contributions of TPs are fixed above its risk-equivalent and 
therewith are overpriced.121 
The major concern by Shariah scholars in this context is that an underwriting surplus 
per se does not represent a profit. Accordingly, mudarabah or more precisely the 
concept of profit-sharing can practically not be applied.122 Underwriting surplus is the 
result of contributions less claims, retakaful costs, reserves and other operational 
expenses. Therefore, it should not be considered as profit but as excess due to 
advantageous conditions leading to fewer claims than usual. A mudarabah 
arrangement aims at generating profit which can be shared between an entrepreneur 
and the capital providers. As a consequence, the practice of mudarabah in 
connection with underwriting appears questionable as an underwriting surplus by 
definition is no profit.123 
A further issue related to the mudarabah model concerns the qard hasan facility. In 
the mudarabah business model, the TO is compelled to grant a qard hasan in case 
there is a deficit in the takaful fund. This practice contradicts however by definition 
the idea of mudarabah as profit-sharing contract. It can be regarded as irrational that 
the operator as entrepreneur (or mudarib) is expected to be a guarantor for the 
capital providers.124 
5.2. Wakalah model 
The wakalah model is grounded on a principal-agent arrangement.125 In an agency 
contract, rights or businesses are delegated to an agent who acts on behalf of 
someone else. He is in charge of contributing his knowledge, skills and abilities in 
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order to fulfil his duties.126 The development of the wakalah model started in Sudan 
and the Middle East,127 where it is also still widely used.128 
5.2.1. Basics of the wakalah model 
In the wakalah model, the TO acts as wakeel (agent) at the behest of the participants 
who assume the role of the principal. They remain also the actual owners of the 
takaful fund. The operator manages both underwriting and investment and is 
compensated for its services by a contractually pre-agreed fee, referred to as 
wakalah fee. This fee can appear either in the form of an absolute amount or in the 
form of a percentage. However, a fee on a percentage basis refers to the turnover of 
contributions or of investment funds, such as 30% of the participants’ donations. It 
may on no account refer to the profit of the takaful undertaking, as in the mudarabah 
model. Consequently, the fee which is deducted from the participants’ contributions 
at the outset of a contract has to cover all management expenses as well as the 
profit for shareholders.129 The wakalah fee is fixed each year in advance upon 
approval by the Shariah Council of the takaful undertaking.130 
Under a pure wakalah contract, all profits resulting from the takaful undertaking 
belong to the TPs who in turn also bear the risk. Accordingly, the shareholders do not 
share in any underwriting surplus.131 The investment profit is also due to the 
participants.132 Part of the surplus can be retained as contingency reserve. The 
remainder should be redistributed to the participants as specified in the contract.133 
There are different options permissible as to how surplus is distributed. For instance, 
it can be paid to all participants in proportion to their contributions or it can be 
distributed between participants who did not make any claim or alternatively who 
made claims less valuable than their contributions.134 On the off chance that there is 
an underwriting deficit, the TO is expected to grant a qard hasan to the risk fund.135 
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5.2.2. Procedure of the wakalah model 
As per the pure wakalah model in general takaful, first of all, the wakalah fee is 
deducted from the participants’ contributions and transferred to the shareholders’ 
account. The remaining amount is assigned to the takaful fund and invested in 
accordance with the Shariah. The investment profit is then transferred to the risk 
fund. The balance of the risk pool is used to cover the operational expenses of the 
takaful undertaking, such as claims, retakaful costs, reserves and other claims-
related costs. The remainder constitutes the underwriting surplus, which is allocated 
entirely to the TPs. The TO or respectively the shareholders account for all 
management and marketing expenses. Consequently, shareholders draw profit when 
the wakalah fee plus the investment income on shareholders’ funds exceed 
expenses from running the business.136 Figure 3 shows a flow chart of the pure 
wakalah model for general takaful. Figure 4 illustrates the model respectively for 
family takaful. 
5.2.3. Discussion of the wakalah model 
In the case the wakalah fee can be matched in accordance to the expense level of 
the takaful undertaking, the capital requirements of the TO can be diminished.137 The 
downside of the pure wakalah model is that it proves difficult for the takaful company 
to take profits unless the wakalah fee is set at a high level.138 Without any incentive 
system, turnover-related fees also tend to result in that profit-oriented operators only 
concentrate on increasing the volume of contributions and neglect its performance in 
underwriting and investment as it has no direct impact on their income.139 
Therefore, there exists also a wakalah model with performance fees. In order to 
provide an incentive, the operator receives, in addition to the wakalah fee, a 
performance-related fee which is taken off the underwriting surplus. Nevertheless, an 
underwriting loss would be solely borne by the TPs.140 From the participants’ point of 
view, a wakalah contract with performance elements may be generally preferred to a 
pure wakalah model if the upfront wakalah fee is reduced accordingly.141 However,  
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Figure 3: Wakalah model in general takaful 
 
 
Figure 4: Wakalah model in family takaful 
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from the perspective of Shariah scholars, the modified model leads to a change in 
the incentive and governance structure. It provokes the same problems as the 
mudarabah model. Many scholars hold that an underwriting surplus as excess of 
contributions belongs completely to the takaful participants. Moreover, if the 
performance element is set at a high level, operators may be induced to claim higher 
contributions from TPs.142 One may argue, however, that providing an incentive to 
the operator is in the interest of participants as it likely enhances its performance. But 
in principle the TO is expected as wakeel to manage the takaful fund as effectively as 
possible. For that, he receives the wakalah fee in return. Besides, if more surplus can 
be distributed among TPs as a result of excellent management on the part of the TO, 
more clients may be attracted. More clients, in turn, will increase the overall income 
of the operator. Under this perspective, the realization of a higher surplus in itself 
should already represent a performance incentive for the operator.143 
Shariah scholars also have expressed concerns in respect to the pure wakalah 
model, or more specifically in terms of the wakalah fee. The fee for the operator is 
charged to the PTF generally as a fixed percentage of gross contributions. 
Contributions are calculated on the basis of a risk premium plus expense margins 
and profit margins for the operator. In order to be competitively viable, insurance 
companies (or TOs) may need to be price-competitive and give discounts on 
premiums (or contributions), be it for large clients or due to the importance of certain 
business lines.144 This is not problematic in conventional insurance as the whole 
premium paid by the policyholder belongs to the insurer. In takaful though, a 
distinction has to be made between the single components of contributions since part 
of it belongs to the participants and part of it is due to the TO. Following realistic 
scenario may happen otherwise: Contributions are priced competitively in order to 
attract clients. That means a discount is given to participants. However, the wakalah 
fee in form of a fixed percentage, such as 30% of the participants’ donations, is 
charged unmodified to the risk fund. As a consequence, the funds in the risk pool 
may not be commensurate to the risk brought into the pool with the result that the 
pool may run into deficit. Thus, the concern in this respect poses the fixed wakalah 
fee and its impact on the takaful fund in a competitive market. It may also bring about 
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issues of inequality among participants which contradicts the concept of takaful. It 
has to be emphasized that this problematic nature can be solved though. The risk 
premium has to be determined separately in relation to the actual risk and discounts 
should be given only in terms of expense and profit margins so as to underwriting 
results do not fluctuate.145 
5.3. Combined model 
The combined model, also referred to as wakalah mudarabah model, represents the 
most prevalent business model in Islamic insurance. As the name suggests, this 
model combines the wakalah model for underwriting with the mudarabah model for 
investment.146 This takaful model is also accredited and recommended as standard 
practice by the AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions).147 
5.3.1. Basics of the combined model 
Under the combined model, a wakalah arrangement is used for the underwriting 
business. That is to say, the TO receives a management fee for its underwriting 
services. In respect to investment activities, a mudarabah contract is applied.148 
Funds are basically managed by the operator as wakeel but on the principles of 
tabarru’ and mudarabah, meaning that investment returns are shared.149 
Consequently, in general takaful, the profit earned from investing the risk fund is 
shared between the TO and the participants. In family takaful, the operator also 
shares in the profit generated from the participants’ investment funds. To sum up, it 
can be stated that the operator receives both a wakalah fee charged on gross 
contributions and a share in investment returns. In terms of underwriting surplus, 
however, there is no profit-sharing.150 
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5.3.2. Procedure of the combined model 
The components as well as the procedure of the combined model in general takaful 
are illustrated in Figure 5. In family business, the PIF has to be integrated into the 
model, as shown in Figure 6. 
5.3.3. Discussion of the combined model 
The combined model avoids the Shariah conflict pertaining to mudarabah in 
underwriting. Still, this business model enables the operator to yield equivalent 
commercial results. Overall, the TO can take advantage of both standard models 
under this arrangement. From the participants’ point of view, however, this takaful 
model entails the potential of maximizing governance issues.151 
In the view of Islamic principles, this model cannot solve all issues. Shariah scholars 
have also added generational matters for consideration. Firstly, there appears an 
intergenerational equity issue due to the accumulation of contingency reserves. In 
early years, reserves need to be build up so as to a higher percentage of the surplus 
is retained for prospective contingencies. Since the participants of a risk fund are 
changing continuously, they may be concerned by an unequal exposure to reserve 
accumulation. Secondly, there are concerns in respect to the provision of a qard 
hasan by the operator, or more specifically in terms of its repayment. Purpose of an 
interest-free loan is to solve immediate illiquidity of the takaful fund. The loan is then 
recovered from future contribution by the participants. It is though very likely that the 
ones who repay the loan are different from the ones who benefited from the loan. 
This leads again to generational inequality.152 However, it has to be pointed out that 
generational issues are not only confined to the combined model, but apply equally to 
its underlying standard models. Furthermore, it could be argued that generational 
concerns are not justified under the concept of tabarru’ or that they are at least of 
inferior relevance. Contributions are considered as donations for mutual help so as to 
the equity issue might seem inappropriate. 
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Figure 5: Combined model in general takaful 
 
 
Figure 6: Combined model in family takaful 
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5.4. Waqf model 
The waqf model, also frequently referred to as wakalah waqf model, was developed 
and is practiced in Pakistan. It shows some resemblances to the combined model. 
The main difference towards the previous models is that, in this business model, the 
PTF constitutes a separate legal entity in form of a waqf. As a consequence, the risk 
fund belongs neither to the operator nor to the participants. The ownership rights of 
the takaful fund are transferred from the TPs to the waqf.153 The relationship between 
the TO and the participants is established via the waqf entity.154 
5.4.1. Concept of waqf 
Waqf is a generally accepted entity in Islamic law which exists since the era of the 
Prophet. Waqf rules are present in most Muslim countries.155 The Arabic term waqf 
stands for a ‘religious endowment’. That means donated assets are detained in order 
to benefit a charitable purpose or a defined group of people, such as the relatives of 
the donor.156 A waqf is established as a separate Shariah entity which has 
incorporated the ability of accepting or transferring ownership. The assets of a waqf 
cannot be alienated, but its usufruct can be allocated to the beneficiaries. There is 
nothing to be said against that members or donors of the waqf are beneficiaries 
themselves. In takaful, the beneficiaries of the waqf are both the TO who creates the 
waqf and the TPs who contribute for the purpose of mutual protection.157 Object of 
the waqf is to support participants in the case of a defined loss as required by the 
regulations of the waqf entity.158 
5.4.2. Characteristics and procedure of the waqf model 
Under the waqf model, the shareholders of the TO donate initial capital in order to 
establish the waqf fund as legal personality. The shareholders relinquish their 
ownership rights immediately after the waqf fund is created. Nevertheless, they are 
entitled to manage the fund,159 or more precisely to appoint an administrator who 
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manages the fund as wakeel on a commercial basis for a fee, and to develop rules 
and regulations concerning it. For distinct types of risk and with it different lines of 
takaful business several waqf funds can be formed. The initial donation of 
shareholders for each waqf fund has to be invested safely and in line with the 
Shariah.160 To comply with the concept of waqf, the initial donation may not be used 
to settle claims. Solely its investment return is to be used for the benefit of 
participants.161 
The TPs donate their contributions as well to the waqf fund whereby they become 
beneficiaries of the fund as specified in the contract. In general takaful, the whole 
donation remains with the waqf. In the case of family takaful, contributions are 
divided into two parts. One part constitutes the risk-related donation for the waqf 
fund; the other part represents the savings element paid into the investment fund.162 
The participants lose likewise their ownership rights of moneys deposited in the waqf 
fund, or more precisely of donations for protection purposes.163 
Funds are invested on the basis of a mudarabah arrangement. That is, the TO acts 
as mudarib and is therefore responsible for the profitable and Shariah compliant 
investment of both waqf and investment funds. In respect to the waqf fund, the 
mudarabah contract takes place between the TO and the waqf, not the participants. 
Hence, the investment profit arising thereby is shared between the takaful company 
and the fund. Investment funds are managed in the same way as in the mudarabah 
or the combined model.164 
The waqf fund compensates for all operational costs like claims and retakaful or 
other operational expenses linked to the takaful undertaking. Apart from ordinary 
technical reserves, the waqf fund may accumulate contingency reserves from both 
contributions and the profit earned on their investment. Reserves as wells as 
investment income realized on it remain assets of the waqf.165 Issues regarding the 
compensation of claims, the distribution of profits, the remuneration of the operator or 
the creation of reserves are laid down by the waqf fund rules.166 
                                                 
160
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 387 
161
 cf. Ernst & Young (2011), 38 
162
 cf. Ayub (2007), 424 
163
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 388 
164
 cf. Ayub (2007), 424-425 
165
 cf. Abdul Rahim et al. (2007), 388-392 
166
 cf. Mortuza Ali (2006), 3 
 32 
The underwriting surplus or deficit is due to the waqf fund. There is no obligation to 
distribute the surplus, but it can be allocated to the participants. Alternatively, an 
underwriting surplus can be used to accumulate reserves,167 or to pay back a 
previously given qard hasan. An interest-free loan is given by shareholders in the 
case of an underwriting deficit in the waqf fund. However, the qard hasan is granted 
directly to the waqf entity and not to the individuals as in the other business 
models.168 
Sources of income for the shareholders are the same as under the combined takaful 
model. They receive a management fee which is paid out of the waqf fund as well as 
a proportion of its investment profit and the investment income from shareholders’ 
money. They bear the management expenses of the takaful undertaking and the 
balance constitutes the shareholders’ profit (or as the case may be the shareholders’ 
loss).169 
As mentioned previously, the contractual relationship of both participants and the 
operator is directly with the waqf fund. The components and relations of the waqf 
model in general takaful are visualized in Figure 7. In family takaful, it has to be taken 
into account that only part of the participants' donation is due to the waqf fund. The 
remainder is paid like in the other models into the participants’ investment fund. 
Figure 8 exemplifies the waqf model for life business. 
5.4.3. Discussion of the waqf model 
As against the other business models, the waqf model implies legal specificities that 
induce economic differences with profound conceptual consequences. The key 
differentiator of the waqf model is the transfer of ownership of the participants’ 
donations from the TPs to the waqf fund. Consequently, claims are established 
directly against the waqf fund. As participants lose their ownership rights, they are 
also not directly entitled to the underwriting surplus. Instead the surplus belongs to 
the waqf as separate legal entity. Its appropriation depends therefore on the decision 
of the TO who manages the waqf fund. The participants lose analogously to their 
rights the obligation to pay further contributions in case of an underwriting deficit.170 
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Figure 8: Waqf model in family takaful 
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However, it is has to be remarked that this obligation is also not fully efficient in the 
other takaful business models since operators are expected to grant a qard hasan in 
the case of a deficit. Theoretically, the beneficiaries of the loan should pay back the 
loan. But in practice, the repayment of the loan happens out of future contributions 
with the result that the group of participants is quite likely to have changed. Hence, it 
is also not each participant individually but rather the PTF who pays back the qard 
hasan. Nevertheless, the waqf model is clearer in this case. As separate legal entity 
the waqf fund benefits of the loan and has to repay it accordingly. The underlying 
economic relations remain the same though. A qard can only be paid back by future 
contributions and not by the waqf with nominal capital.171 
In literature, there are contradicting opinions pertaining to the waqf model. Whereas 
some research signalizes the business model as best practice for Islamic insurance, 
it is approached with scepticism by others. It is beyond question that the 
incorporation of a waqf structure in takaful raises more issues than Shariah 
compliancy and governance principles. Legal or tax aspects can play also a 
prominent role.172 
Opponents of the waqf model are especially sceptical about the permissibility of a 
waqf with nominal capital that is not sufficient to back up the beneficiaries as well as 
about the temporary membership of participants based on term contracts. Some 
scholars reject the waqf model arguing that it corresponds technically to conventional 
insurance. By establishing the risk fund as separate legal entity, the principal 
characteristic of takaful, namely mutuality in risk protection, is considered to dissolve. 
Accordingly, participants in a waqf-based scheme do not form a solidarity group but 
rather purchase insurance from a legal person so as to differences to conventional 
insurance remain solely in terms of asset management.173 Regarding the fee and 
incentive structure of the operator, the waqf model faces the same concerns as the 
wakalah model.174 
As opposed to this, there are also Shariah scholars who consider the waqf model as 
“best basis for evolving a practical takaful system in line with the Shariah 
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principles”.175 According to them, the incorporation of the waqf concept into the 
wakalah (or combined) model constitutes a definite improvement.176 In these 
business models, the donations of participants are conditional as they might come 
back to them in form of indemnities or surplus distribution. As a consequence, 
proportionate ownership remains with the TPs and tabarru’, or in other words their 
donation, can be regarded as incomplete. In the waqf-based scheme, tabarru’ 
becomes part of the waqf fund and is therewith complete.177 In the view of the 
proponents of the model and contradictory to the preceding opinion, the concept of 
waqf emphasizes the non-commercial structure of takaful undertakings being based 
on mutual assistance.178 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
All four business models presented are currently in practice. It is obvious that each 
model can be criticized to a certain extend. It is therefore important to keep in mind 
that interpretations of the Shariah can vary widely among Islamic scholars and 
jurisdictions. A fatwah issued does not automatically become applicable to all 
Muslims around the world. It can be observed though that the mudarabah model with 
surplus sharing is most commonly rejected, especially in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) countries, and that there is a trend towards the combined and the waqf 
model. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate goal is a uniform business model that minimizes current 
and future Shariah concerns.179 A unified approach by all takaful companies is 
essential to achieve consumer confidence, to compete with conventional insurance 
and to ensure sustainable growth of the whole takaful industry. At a national level, a 
trend towards standardization can be already noted.180 However, a global standard is 
not yet in sight. 
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6. Retakaful 
Retakaful can be regarded as Islamic alternative to reinsurance. Just as reinsurance 
can be defined as insurance of insurance, retakaful can be explained as takaful of 
takaful. The first retakaful undertaking was launched in 1985 by Al Baraka.181 
6.1. Role of retakaful 
Reinsurance is an essential precondition for a vital global economy as it provides risk 
protection across geographical regions. Retakaful answers the same purposes as 
reinsurance. First of all, it allows for risk spreading over different takaful pools while 
providing underwriting capacity for each pool. By the means of retakaful, risk 
portfolios cannot only be spread effectively across risk pools but also across 
territories. In addition, retakaful can mitigate substantially the ramifications of 
catastrophic events. Due to Islamic reinsurance, TOs are also in a position to 
underwrite major industrial and mega risks without the need to put up colossal 
amounts of capital. Thereby, they are up to competing with established conventional 
insurance companies. Moreover, in cases of natural or man-made disastrous events 
with monumental losses, retakaful is indispensable in order to reduce the chance of 
risk of ruin for the whole takaful industry.182 
6.2. Principles of retakaful 
In principle, a contract of retakaful can be considered as a takaful agreement which, 
in turn, implies that all takaful principles must be applied as well.183 A retakaful fund is 
consequently subject to the same ideas as a takaful fund. This entails that the 
retakaful pool is equally built on the concept of tabarru’. By combining the risks of 
several takaful pools of different TOs, the retakaful pool can be regarded as an 
instrument to widen the spectrum of solidarity.184 Retakaful basically extends the idea 
of mutual help as participants of one takaful pool back up the participants of another 
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pool and vice versa. This represents a unique feature of Islamic reinsurance with 
respect to conventional insurance.185 
Although in practice retakaful arrangements are contracted between the TO and the 
retakaful operator, it is ultimately a contract between the takaful and the retakaful 
fund. The retakaful company does not bear any risk; it is solely the manager of the 
retakaful pool. Under a retakaful arrangement, the TO transfers part of a risk fund’s 
obligation to a retakaful fund. For this purpose, a part of the assets in the risk pool 
has to be donated to the retakaful fund. This amount constitutes the retakaful 
contribution. The retakaful fund compensates for claims and other retakaful related 
expenses. The retakaful operator, whose role can be compared to the one of a TO, is 
also entitled to a fee (or profit-sharing) which is paid out of the retakaful fund in return 
for his services rendered. His remuneration depends on the underlying business 
model. For instance, in a pure mudarabah model the retakaful operator will share in 
the results of the retakaful fund; in a pure wakalah model he will receive a 
management fee. Irrespective of the model adopted, the fee or profit-sharing ratio 
has to be contractually defined between the takaful and the retakaful operator. In the 
case the retakaful fund runs into deficit, the retakaful operator has to provide a qard 
hasan to the fund. However, neither the retakaful operator has to grant an interest-
free loan for a takaful fund in deficit, nor the TO has this obligation for a retakaful 
fund.186 Figure 9 illustrates the basic structure of retakaful. 
6.3. Necessity of retakaful 
Due to the rapid growth of the takaful industry, the existence of Islamic reinsurance is 
imperative in order to achieve long-term sustainability.187 Given the fact that the 
takaful industry is characterized by rather small companies, its dependence on 
retakaful is even more pronounced.188 
As takaful operators commit to full Shariah compliancy, they principally have to draw 
on Islamic reinsurance. However, owing to the absence of sufficient retakaful 
capacity, TOs got temporary permission by Islamic scholars to reinsure with 
conventional reinsurance companies based on the Islamic concept of dharura. 
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Consequently, this exemption is only applicable as long as there is no suitable 
retakaful supply.189 It can be observed that the retakaful capacity is increasingly 
expanding. Thereby, the possibility for pooling risk with other TOs across diversified 
locations is more and more provided and the temporary permission is getting 
gradually void.190 
In consideration of the limited number of retakaful operators, the variety of practiced 
takaful models can be critical. Therefore, it is vital for the retakaful industry to be 
equipped with business models that are compatible with any underlying models 
employed by TOs. Retakaful contracts should not founder on business model 
incompatibility as this would be a strain on the whole takaful industry.191 
 
Figure 9: Basic model of retakaful 
 
Source:  M. Akoob, Reinsurance and Retakaful, in: Archer et al. (2009), 157 
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7. Takaful market 
The takaful industry commenced only in 1979 and has experienced rapid and 
vigorous growth since 2003.192 Takaful business has an enormous potential as 
insurance penetration in Islamic countries is eminently low.193 Along with it, it has to 
be emphasized that Islam constitutes the second largest as well as the fastest 
growing religion in the world.194 However, the takaful market is also challenged by the 
underlying conditions in most Islamic countries, such as the low level of awareness 
about financial protection.195 
In the following, after an analysis of the current takaful market, both opportunities and 
challenges for the Islamic insurance industry are examined. 
7.1. Current situation 
The takaful market is currently concentrated in the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) region and in Southeast Asia.196 Global gross takaful contributions reached 
US$ 7 billion in 2009 and are expected to accomplish US$ 12 billion by 2011.197 The 
compounded annual growth rate of the takaful industry amounts to at least 20 to 
30%. There are more than 250 takaful undertakings worldwide.198 However, the 
majority thereof is situated in Malaysia and the GCC countries.199 
Malaysia represents so far the most significant market for Islamic insurance 
alongside the Arab region and makes up 72% of the non-Arabic business.200 Due to 
the fact that it constitutes one of the largest and most developed takaful markets, 
Malaysia has become a reference point for the whole industry. Surprisingly, its 
Muslim population accounts for only 60%. Hence, Malaysia’s pioneering role is rather 
attributable to its regulatory authorities which enforced and drove growth notably in 
this market. With an insurance penetration201 rate of 4.94% in 2006, Malaysia’s 
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overall insurance market is one of the most developed of the MENA and Southeast 
Asia. Furthermore, it has one of the highest life penetration rates of these countries. 
Life business adds up to 3.2% and is therewith even higher than the non-life 
business with 1.74% respectively.202 In 2009, Malaysia’s takaful penetration rate 
amounted to 0.60%.203 
In the GCC countries with an average Muslim population of approximately 95%,204 
the growth rates of takaful exceed distinctly the ones of conventional insurance.205 
However, life business is still undeveloped. The penetration of insurance as a whole 
and especially of family takaful is extremely low.206 It can be observed that growth in 
the GCC is primarily due to the fact that insurance is increasingly made compulsory 
and not due to voluntary policies.207 In 2005, the Central Bank of Bahrain set up the 
region’s first comprehensive insurance rulebook, containing also specific takaful 
regulations and is therewith one of the more proactive regulators in the GCC.208 
Bahrain has as well the highest overall insurance penetration rate of the GCC region 
with 2.59% in 2009. The takaful penetration rate amounts to 0.45%. The United Arab 
Emirates also have a relatively high insurance penetration rate of 2.19% in 2009, and 
a takaful penetration rate of 0.31% respectively. Saudi Arabia shows the highest 
takaful penetration rate in the region with 1.05% in 2009 corresponding virtually to 
the overall insurance penetration.209 Qatar represents one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world.210 Nevertheless, its insurance penetration rate was still 
below 1% in 2009, just as in Kuwait and the Oman.211 
7.2. Market opportunities 
Takaful represents the fastest growing area of the global insurance market. With 
growth rates of way beyond 20% annually it outnumbers significantly conventional 
insurance business at an average growth level of approximately 5% per annum.212 
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Whereas the insurance market in Western countries is already quite saturated and 
shows a penetration rate of 9.45% on average for the G7 countries in 2006, Islamic 
countries exhibit frequently an insurance penetration rate below 1%.213 
The pronounced underinsured status of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims214 is in 
particular conductive to the immense growth potential of Islamic insurance. No 
insurer can afford to neglect this potential customer base. Furthermore, the clientele 
is characterized by a youthful demography. 60% of the Muslim population is under 25 
years old and achieving gradually affluence. Such a customer base – if it can be 
captured early – presents a great opportunity for the takaful industry.215 
In the light of the economic boom for oil production, the future of the takaful market in 
the Middle East looks auspicious. Especially the life insurance business is still 
extremely undeveloped and offers therefore a huge growth potential for family 
takaful. This is also likely to be stimulated by the demographic change and its strain 
on the social welfare systems. An increase in compulsory insurance drives also the 
Islamic insurance demand in this region.216 
It has to be considered that there are large Muslim communities in the Western 
countries as well. Although Western Europe accommodates less than 1% of the 
world’s Muslim population, it is suggested that it accounts for 40% of the potential 
Muslim demand for takaful at present. By adding the US, this proportion increases 
even to 60%. Consequently, takaful undertakings should not consider only the actual 
Islamic population but also affluence and propensity to buy takaful products. Muslim 
communities in Western countries offer therefore a tremendous untapped opportunity 
for the Islamic insurance industry.217  
So far, it is generally accepted to insure with conventional insurers if there is no 
Shariah compliant alternative. Due to the ongoing development of the whole takaful 
industry, it may become more and more unacceptable for Muslims to make use of 
conventional insurance. In particular in Western countries, takaful may not only 
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attract new uninsured customers but also induce Muslims to change to takaful 
products. 218 
It has to be emphasized at this point that takaful is not limited to Muslims only. It is 
acceptable to all communities and faiths.219 Takaful puts an emphasis on 
transparency and on an explicit ethical structure. Ethical financial services appeal to 
Muslim as well as non-Muslim customers alike.220 It is suggested that up to 20% of 
the total takaful revenues could arise from non-Muslim customers.221 
To these opportunities a spiritual dimension can be added, promoting especially life 
insurance. Doing good deeds is deeply held in the Islam. For instance, the payment 
of zakat is one of the principal injunctions on Muslims as per the Qur’an. It is an 
almsgiving for the redistribution of wealth and constitutes one of the five immutable 
pillars of Islamic faith.222 Zakat is a compulsory levy, in general 2.5% of the income, 
to transfer revenue from the wealthy to the needy.223 If the takaful industry succeeds 
in designing and promoting takaful products so as to buying insurance is associated 
with doing good deeds, there is a further huge market potential for takaful. Such a 
spiritual motivation is, though, not limited to Muslims only. It can be observed, for 
example, that people of all religious orientations respond to donation campaigns in 
the case of natural disasters. The sole difference is that donations are collected after 
a tragedy occurred whereas in takaful contributions are made prior to any such 
event. Compared to conventional insurance where policyholders receive nothing if 
there is no claim, participants in a takaful scheme may at least derive satisfaction 
from doing good deeds. This spiritual benefit can be a very powerful motivation for 
takaful customers.224 
7.3. Challenges 
Despite all these opportunities, takaful companies are also faced with several 
challenges as they are still in their start-up phase compared to conventional 
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insurers.225 The Islamic insurance market is in its formation and, in most countries, 
affected by a poor infrastructure for this novel industry. Hence, takaful operators are 
especially strategically challenged.226 
One of the main challenges of the takaful industry is to create customer awareness 
about the takaful concept itself. Many Muslims oppose insurance on grounds of 
religious reasons. It is therefore important to assure the Islamic clientele full Shariah 
compliancy of Islamic insurance. Sustained success can only be ensured by 
educating potential customers about the characteristics of the entire takaful system. 
In GCC countries for instance, the public welfare systems as well as the joint-family 
network represent one of the main competitors for family takaful. Hence, the 
additional advantages of takaful need to be signalized.227 Furthermore, there is the 
misconception that Islamic insurance is exclusively for Muslims. Only Malaysia 
succeeded so far in attracting a significant non-Muslim customer base. In this 
context, it is necessary to offer a wide range of takaful products in order to compete 
with conventional insurers. Also low income groups need to be taken into 
consideration with accordingly suitable products.228 All in all, it is essential for the 
takaful industry as a whole to raise awareness and a deeper understanding amongst 
the general public.229 
Growth of takaful depends heavily on the development of Islamic banking. The 
Islamic financial services industry is still concerned with a lack in asset classes that 
are in line with the Shariah.230 Due to the restricted investment universe, the 
management of investment portfolios is a lot more challenging for takaful operators 
than for conventional insurance companies.231 There is especially a shortage of 
short-term non-equity financial instruments as well as Shariah compliant market 
instruments.232 As a consequence, there is a strong reliance on assets like equities 
and real estate which may be subject to volatility and liquidity risk. However, as the 
Islamic banking industry is expanding, the spectrum of Islamic financial products is 
also broadening and more investment options such as sukuk (Islamic bonds) are 
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becoming disposable to takaful operators.233 A key challenge for the takaful industry 
is therefore the availability of Shariah compliant investment avenues. 
The takaful industry is also lacking an explicit regulatory and accounting framework in 
most countries. Takaful faces widely different legal systems. Some jurisdictions, like 
Saudi Arabia or Sudan, are solely based on Islamic law. Other countries, such as 
Malaysia and Bahrain, operate on a dual judicial system, meaning a combination of 
Shariah based law and common or civil law. And there are also jurisdictions, like the 
Western European countries, where the Shariah has no influence on the legal 
system.234 Besides this legal disparity, specific laws governing takaful are still 
missing in many jurisdictions.235 It is vital that regulatory authorities draw up 
appropriate laws, rules and regulations for the takaful business in order to ensure its 
unobjectionable progress.236 
Due to the fact that there are different schools of thought in Islam, scholars vary also 
in their interpretations concerning the Shariah. This complicates standardization and 
the creation of rules by regulators.237 Considering the relative immaturity of the 
takaful industry, differing takaful practices and interpretations may also lead to a 
negative public image in the future.238 Pluralism in Islam is unavoidable. However, 
regarding the takaful industry, a more standardized approach is absolutely 
essential.239 A major challenge is the development of business conduct standards 
that are in line with the Shariah and in accordance with a conventional regulatory 
framework.240 In this context, dissensions appertaining to different takaful business 
models need to be resolved. Competition between these models is likely to create 
confusion among customers which may impair the growth of the whole takaful 
industry. In particular, criticism of competing business models by TOs is a strain on 
the Islamic insurance market.241 
A serious shortage of qualified human resources poses another challenge for the 
takaful industry. TOs require staff who have both insurance know-how and 
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knowledge of Shariah compliance.242 Business continuity of takaful undertakings may 
be jeopardized by the loss of senior officers. Due to the rapid growth of the Islamic 
insurance market, staff retention may become demanding and costly.243 
Furthermore, takaful operators are facing more and more competition from both 
conventional insurance companies and other takaful undertakings. They are also 
generally outperformed by conventional insurers in terms of investment returns and 
economies of scale. Owing to their small size, economies of scale represent a major 
challenge for many of them.244 It can be observed that the number of Islamic 
insurance players is increasing strongly in the key markets. Especially small local 
operators are in competition with established conventional insurers. As a 
consequence, further capacity, underwriting expertise and enhanced broker 
relationships are vital for TOs.245 
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8. Conclusion 
Takaful is a relative new concept with an immense potential. It is a viable alternative 
to conventional insurance for the 1.6 billion Muslims around the world. Islamic 
insurance represents an instrument for economic growth and social improvement in 
Islamic countries. Due to its ethical structure and transparency, takaful is appealing 
to non-Muslims likewise. 
Islamic insurance is based on the principles of mutual assistance and tabarru’. That 
way, it avoids the critical elements of gharar, maisir and riba that render conventional 
insurance unlawful under the Shariah. Takaful undertakings operate as a hybrid of a 
mutual and a commercial form of company. Participants participate in a mutual 
scheme of risk cover. The takaful operator, as a company with shareholders, 
manages underwriting and investment for and on behalf of the participants. The TO 
does not take profit from insurance activities but is remunerated for its services 
rendered. Takaful draws a distinction between general and family business. General 
takaful is intended for protection purposes only so as to the whole contribution of the 
TPs is paid into the participants’ takaful fund. Family business serves both protection 
and saving purposes. As a consequence, one part of the participant’s contribution is 
paid into the PTF and the other part is used for investment. In the case of a deficit in 
the risk fund, the TO is expected to provide a qard hasan. This loan has to be repaid 
out of future contributions. To ensure Shariah compliancy, takaful undertakings are 
monitored by a Shariah Supervisory Board. 
There are different takaful models used in practice. This thesis concentrates on the 
four common business models: the mudarabah, the wakalah, the combined and the 
waqf model. All business models pursue the same goal of sharing individual risks 
collectively to reduce the risk exposure of each individual. They differ primarily in the 
definition of the relationship between the operator and the participants and in the 
thereof resulting remuneration of the TO. By examining the models closely, critical 
issues can be detected for each model. Pertaining to the concerns of Islamic 
scholars, one should keep in mind that interpretations of the Shariah can vary widely 
amongst scholars and territories. As a consequence, the choice of a business model 
and its permissibility depend also on the characteristics of the respective region or 
jurisdiction. Although real standardization is not yet in sight, a regional tendency of 
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takaful models can be observed. Nevertheless, a consensus-based approach by the 
entire takaful industry as well as a uniform business model that minimizes current 
and future Shariah concerns would be highly desirable. 
Standardization in general poses a major challenge for the Islamic insurance 
industry. Besides a unified takaful model, business conduct standards as well as 
legal and regulatory norms need to be developed. The complexity of this issue is 
obvious considering already the contradictory terminology concerning business 
models. It is imperative for the whole takaful business to meet the challenge. Only 
that way, consumer understanding and awareness of the takaful concept can be 
achieved and with it sustainable success of the industry. 
Apart from this, it has to be emphasized that the takaful business shows great market 
opportunities. On the one hand, the low insurance penetration in Islamic countries 
promises gigantic growth rates. On the other hand, takaful has also a non-
neglectable potential in Western countries appealing to both Muslims and non-
Muslims due to its unique nature. All in all, increasing awareness, the development of 
the Islamic banking industry, as well as globalization and an expected increase in the 
Muslim population will be conductive to takaful gaining critical mass and becoming a 
real and identifiable sector of the world insurance market. 
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aqilah agreement of tribal solidarity 
D  
dharura necessity 
diyah blood money 
G  
general takaful Islamic non-life insurance 
gharar uncertainty 
H  
haram unlawful, forbidden 
I  
ijma consensus of Islamic community on a legal issue 
F  
family takaful Islamic life insurance 
fatwah (pl. fatawah) juristic opinion concerning Islamic law 
K  
kafala  to guarantee 
M  
maisir speculation, gambling 
maslaha public interest 





investment fund in a takaful scheme 
participants' takaful fund 
(PTF) 




qard hasan interest-free loan 
qiyas analogical reasoning by Shariah scholars 
Qur'an central religious text of Islam 
R  
rabb al maal capital providers 
retakaful Islamic reinsurance 
riba interest 
S  
Shariah Islamic law 
Shariah Supervisory 
Board/Council 
internal or external religious advisors who ensure adherence to 
Shariah rules and principles of a takaful undertaking 
sukuk Islamic equivalent of a bond 
Sunnah word and actions of or approved by Prophet Muhammad 
T  
ta'awun mutual assistance 
tabarru' donation, contribution, gift (in takaful contract = contribution paid 
by TPs) 
takaful Islamic insurance 
takaful operator (TO) equivalent to the insurance company in conventional insurance 
takaful participant (TP) equivalent to a policyholder in conventional insurance 
W  
wakalah principal-agent agreement (a person nominates another to act 
on his behalf) 
wakalah fee management fee 
wakeel agent (in takaful, this is the TO) 
waqf religious endowment, trust fund 
Z  
zakat one of the Five Pillars of Islam; giving of a fixed portion of one's 




Conventional insurance is considered as unlawful under the Islamic law as it involves 
at least three forbidden elements, namely gharar (uncertainty), maisir (speculation) 
and riba (interest). In order to align insurance with Islamic principles, takaful (Islamic 
insurance) was introduced. Takaful is based on the concepts of mutual assistance 
and tabarru’ (voluntary contribution). In a typical takaful undertaking, the risk funds of 
the participants (policyholders) operate on a mutual basis, but are managed by a 
takaful operator which is a company with shareholders. 
Main focus of this thesis is an examination of the different business models of takaful 
applied in practice. In this respect, the four most common takaful models, namely the 
mudarabah, the wakalah, the combined and the waqf model, are explained and 
discussed in detail. In principle, these business models differ solely in the definition of 
the relationship between the operator and the participants and the thereof resulting 
kind of remuneration of the operator. There is no clear overall preference of one 
business model, only regional trends can be observed. However, the ultimate goal is 
a uniform business model. 
Retakaful (Islamic reinsurance) represents an essential part of the whole takaful 
industry in order to ensure its sustainable growth. Takaful business shows an 
enormous potential with growth rates of way beyond 20% annually. The industry is 





Westliche Versicherungen werden unter islamischem Gesetz als rechtswidrig 
betrachtet, da sie gegen mindestens drei Verbote verstoßen. Zu diesen zählen das 
Verbot von Unsicherheit in Verträgen (gharar), das Verbot der Spekulation (maisir) 
sowie das Zinsverbot (riba). Takaful stellt als Islamische Versicherung eine 
Alternative zur herkömmlichen Versicherung dar. Takaful berücksichtigt islamische 
Grundsätze und basiert auf dem Prinzip der gegenseitigen Hilfe. Ein 
Hauptunterscheidungsmerkmal zur konventionellen Versicherung ist die Verwendung 
eines Spendenvertrags (tabarru’), der den gewöhnlichen Kaufvertrag ersetzt. Die 
Versicherten zahlen in einen gemeinsamen Fonds ein und teilen damit das Risiko 
ähnlich wie bei einem Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit.  Der Versicherer 
oder besser gesagt der Takaful Operator verwaltet lediglich den Fonds und 
berechnet dafür Gebühren. 
Schwerpunkt der Magisterarbeit liegt auf der Auseinandersetzung mit den 
verschiedenen Takaful-Modellen, die in der Praxis zur Anwendung kommen. 
Diesbezüglich werden die vier geläufigsten Geschäftsmodelle dargestellt und 
erörtert. Dazu gehören das Wakalah Modell, das Mudarabah Modell, das Waqf 
Modell sowie eine Kombination der ersten beiden Modelle. Im Grunde unterscheiden 
sich die Modelle nur in der Beziehung zwischen dem Takaful Operator und den 
Versicherten und in der sich daraus ergebenden Vergütung des Operators. 
Insgesamt kann keine eindeutige Präferenz für ein Geschäftsmodell festgestellt 
werden, sondern lediglich regionale Tendenzen. Endziel wäre jedoch ein 
standardisiertes Takaful-Modell. 
Retakaful (Islamische Rückversicherung) ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der 
gesamten Takaful-Branche, um nachhaltigen Erfolg sicher zu stellen. Takaful zeigt 
ein immenses Potential mit jährlichen Wachstumsraten von weit über 20%. Die 
islamische Versicherungsbranche befindet sich noch in ihrer Anlaufphase. Damit hat 
sie die besten Voraussetzungen, um von vielversprechenden Möglichkeiten zu 
profitieren, muss sich aber im Gegenzug auch einigen Herausforderungen stellen. 
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